Upholding Citizens’ Privacy in the Use of Stingray Technology: Is New York Behind? by Hazen, Samantha
Pace Law Review 
Volume 37 
Issue 1 Fall 2016 Article 10 
March 2017 
Upholding Citizens’ Privacy in the Use of Stingray Technology: Is 
New York Behind? 
Samantha Hazen 
Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace University, shazen@law.pace.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr 
 Part of the Communications Law Commons, Criminal Law Commons, Fourth Amendment Commons, 
Science and Technology Law Commons, and the State and Local Government Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Samantha Hazen, Upholding Citizens’ Privacy in the Use of Stingray Technology: Is New York 
Behind?, 37 Pace L. Rev. 352 (2017) 
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/10 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Pace Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more 
information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu. 
  
352 
Upholding Citizens’ Privacy in 
the Use of Stingray Technology: Is 
New York Behind? 
 
Samantha Hazen* 
 
I. Introduction 
The word “Stingray” likely does not resonate with citizens 
as something other than a marine animal.  But in the realm of 
privacy, the word carries a much different (perhaps more 
dangerous) meaning.  Stingray devices belong to a family of 
cell-site simulators that track a cell phone user’s location.1  
Federal, state, and local agencies purchase these devices and 
use them during investigations to pinpoint a suspect’s 
location.2  The devices—which are the size of a briefcase—act 
as cell phone towers and gather enough identifying information 
to locate the suspect.3 
Despite its obvious advantage of promoting security, the 
technology also plays a controversial role: detecting and 
tracking cell phones besides the suspect’s.4  The idea of 
tracking multiple cell phones in a given region raises privacy 
 
  * J.D. Candidate, May 2017, Elisabeth Haub School of Law at Pace 
University.  Seeing my work in print is a very humbling experience, and I 
owe this opportunity to Pace Law Review.  I would like to thank Professor 
David N. Dorfman and Professor Bennett L. Gershman for providing 
guidance and for listening to my ideas in this ever-developing field.  I am 
forever thankful to those who have stuck by my side, not only as I worked on 
this paper, but throughout law school as well.  
  1. Ryan Gallagher, Meet the Machines that Steal Your Phone’s Data, ARS 
TECHNICA (Sept. 25, 2013, 1:00 PM), http://arstechnica.com/tech-
policy/2013/09/meet-the-machines-that-steal-your-phones-data/. 
2. Stingray Tracking Devices, ACLU, 
https://www.aclu.org/issues/privacy-technology/surveillance-
technologies/stingray-tracking-devices (last visited Nov. 12, 2015). 
3. Legislative Memo: In Support of a Warrant Requirement for the Use of 
Stingrays, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 24, 2015), 
http://www.nyclu.org/content/support-of-warrant-requirement-use-of-
stingrays [hereinafter Legislative Memo]. 
4. Id. 
1
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concerns and other questions.5  For example, what do agencies 
do with the location information?  Do they delete the 
information, or store it indefinitely?  Should bystanders be 
concerned that agencies will access their calls and text 
messages?  The United States Department of Justice 
[hereinafter “DOJ”] acknowledged these concerns and 
introduced a new policy on September 3, 2015 for federal 
agencies’ use of the technology.6 
The DOJ’s new policy prioritizes “transparency and 
accountability,” which ultimately “increase[s] privacy” for 
citizens.7  In the past, federal law enforcement agencies simply 
needed “legal authorization[]” to use cell-site simulators under 
the federal Pen Register Statute.8  Now, federal agents must 
apply for a “search warrant supported by probable cause” 
before using the devices.9  The warrant requirement is waived, 
however, in exigent or exceptional circumstances.10  The DOJ 
also revealed that it will delete data as soon as the suspect is 
found, and it will not collect data such as text messages and 
emails.11  In its policy, the DOJ explained that cell-site 
 
5. See Julia Edwards, Justice Department Tightens Cellphone Tracking 
Rules, REUTERS (Sept. 3, 2015, 9:12 PM), 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/09/04/us-usa-justice-mobilephone-
idUSKCN0R32B420150904#2GlQ782uO0Rs9JBv.97. 
6. Id. 
7. Justice Department Announces Enhanced Policy for Use of Cell-Site 
Simulators, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Sept. 3, 2015), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/justice-department-announces-enhanced-policy-
use-cell-site-simulators [hereinafter Justice Department Announces]. 
8. Id.  See Department of Justice Policy Guidance: Use of Cell-Site 
Simulator Technology, U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST. (Sept. 3, 2015), 
https://www.justice.gov/opa/file/767321/download [hereinafter Department of 
Justice Policy Guidance]. 
9. Justice Department Announces, supra note 7. 
10. Id.  Exigent circumstances exist when “the needs of law enforcement 
[are] so compelling that the warrantless search is objectively reasonable 
under the Fourth Amendment.”  Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 394 (1978).  
See Missouri v. McNeely, 133 S. Ct. 1552, 1559 (2013) (citations omitted) 
(holding that officers may sometimes conduct a warrantless search “to 
prevent the imminent destruction of justice”); Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 
U.S. 398, 403 (2006) (finding exigent circumstances when officers tend to 
“persons who are seriously injured or threatened with such injury”); United 
States v. Santana, 427 U.S. 38, 42-43 (1976) (holding that officers did not 
need a warrant to re-enter the suspect’s home during a “chase”). 
11. Justice Department Announces, supra note 7. 
2https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/10
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simulators are not to be confused with a global-positioning 
system (GPS) because cell-site simulators “do not obtain or 
download any location information from the device or its 
applications.”12  The DOJ also stated that cell-site simulators 
“must be configured as pen registers” and accord with relevant 
statutory provisions, including 18 U.S.C. § 3127.13  Finally, the 
DOJ emphasized that the policy “is intended only to improve 
the internal management of the Department of Justice.  It is 
not intended to and does not create any right, benefit, trust, or 
responsibility, whether substantive or procedural, enforceable 
at law . . . [or] any right of review in an administrative, 
judicial, or any other proceeding.”14 
One month later, the United States Department of 
Homeland Security [hereinafter “DHS”] followed the DOJ’s 
lead and implemented a probable cause requirement for the 
use of cell-site simulators.15  Similar to the DOJ’s policy, the 
DHS will not require its agents to seek warrants supported by 
probable cause in exigent or exceptional circumstances.16  The 
 
12. Department of Justice Policy Guidance, supra note 8, at 3.  But see 
infra note 132.  Despite the DOJ’s distinction, the United States Supreme 
Court in United States v. Jones still regarded the use of GPS as a search 
requiring a warrant under the Fourth Amendment.  See generally United 
States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
13. Department of Justice Policy Guidance, supra note 8, at 2.  For a 
discussion of pen register use and the Fourth Amendment, see Smith v. 
Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979) (holding that “[t]he installation and use of a 
pen register. . . was not a ‘search,’ and no warrant was required”).  Only 
seven years after Smith, however, Congress limited pen register use through 
various statutes, indicating that pen registers should not go unregulated.  
JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: 
INVESTIGATING CRIME 112 n.3 (5th ed. 2013). 
14. Department of Justice Policy Guidance, supra note 8, at 2 n.2. 
15. Department Policy Regarding the Use of Cell-Site Simulator 
Technology, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 19, 2015), 
https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/Department%20Policy%2
0Regarding%20the%20Use%20of%20Cell-
Site%20Simulator%20Technology.pdf [hereinafter Department Policy]. 
16. Id.  See supra note 10 for examples of exigent circumstances.  The 
DHS also lists the following: “the need to protect human life or avert serious 
injury; the prevention of the imminent destruction of evidence; the hot 
pursuit of a fleeing felon; or the prevention of escape by a suspect or convicted 
fugitive from justice.”  Id.  For exceptional circumstances, including 
“potential uses of the technology in furtherance of protective duties pursuant 
to 18 U.S.C. § 3056 and 18 U.S.C. § 3056A,” agents are required to “obtain 
approval from executive-level personnel at the Component’s [DHS’s] 
3
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DHS makes clear, however, that its agents must still obtain 
judicial approval pursuant to the Pen Register Statute and 
must comply with the statute’s emergency provisions.17  When 
submitting applications to the court, DHS agents “must 
disclose appropriately and accurately the underlying purpose 
and activities for which an order or authorization is sought.”18  
The agents must also explain, with specificity, their desired 
technique, their goal in using the technology, any disruptions 
in cellular service, and their method of collecting and deleting 
data.19  The new policy echoes the DOJ’s policy by affording 
privacy to citizens and assuring their civil liberties are not 
violated through the use of advanced technology.20 
The United States Internal Revenue Service [hereinafter 
“IRS”] became the third federal agency to rethink its cell-site 
simulator policy before the end of 2015.21  John A. Koskinen, 
IRS Commissioner, provided details about the agency’s cell-site 
simulator use, which began in 2011.22  In a letter to United 
States Senator Ron Wyden, Koskinen wrote that the IRS’s 
Criminal Investigation division [hereinafter “IRS-CI”] 
currently owns one simulator, but is actively seeking another.23  
The IRS-CI first used its simulator during “early 2012” and has 
since tracked thirty-seven cell phones “in support of eleven 
federal grand jury investigations.”24  Koskinen wrote that the 
agency also used the simulator during a Drug Enforcement 
Agency [hereinafter “DEA”] action.25  In sum, the DOJ’s 
September 2015 policy spurred change within the IRS.26  The 
agency decided that it would “mirror the DOJ policy’s 
 
headquarters and the relevant U.S. Attorney, who coordinates approval 
within the Department of Justice.” Id. 
17. Id.  See 18 U.S.C. §§ 3121, 3125 (2012). 
18. Department Policy, supra note 15. 
19. Id. 
20. Id. 
21. Letter from John A. Koskinen, IRS Comm’r, to Ron Wyden, U.S 
Senator (Nov. 25, 2015), 
http://www.wyden.senate.gov/download/?id=6c9cd25c-28d1-4cda-9199-
04a15c0b5d33&download=1. 
22. Id. 
23. Id. 
24. Id. 
25. Id. 
26. Letter from John A. Koskinen, supra note 21. 
4https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/10
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requirement[s]” and draft a new policy by November 30, 2015.27 
While these new policies represent a big step toward 
privacy and transparency in information-gathering, they do not 
extend as far as many would prefer.  In fact, the DOJ’s policy 
does not apply to state and local law enforcement agencies, 
unless the DOJ uses the devices “in support of” these other 
agencies.28  The DHS’s new policy, too, only applies to the 
actions of its own agents, though the DHS recognizes that its 
agents often work with state and local governments.29 
According to a map created by the American Civil Liberties 
Union [hereinafter “ACLU”], “57 agencies in 22 states and the 
District of Columbia” use Stingray technology.30  The ACLU’s 
map differentiates among states that use cell-site simulators at 
the local level, the state level, or both. 31  Some of these states, 
including Washington and Virginia, have a warrant 
requirement, but many do not.32  Most recently, in October 
2015, California implemented a warrant requirement for access 
to “electronic communication information,” which includes 
“location of the sender or recipients at any point during the 
communication.”33  New York, which uses Stingrays at the local 
and state levels,34 does not have a Stingray policy that requires 
warrants supported by probable cause.35 
 
27. Id. 
28. Ellen Nakashima, Justice Department: Agencies Need Warrant to Use 
Cellphone Trackers, WASH. POST (Sept. 3, 2015), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/justice-department-
agencies-will-have-to-obtain-warrant-before-using-cellphone-surveillance-
technology/2015/09/03/08e44b70-5255-11e5-933e-7d06c647a395_story.html; 
Department of Justice Policy Guidance, supra note 8, at 6. 
29. Department Policy, supra note 15. 
30. Stingray Tracking Devices: Who’s Got Them, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES 
UNION, https://www.aclu.org/map/stingray-tracking-devices-whos-got-
them#agencies (last visited Oct. 20, 2016) [hereinafter Stingray Tracking 
Devices]. 
31. Id. 
32. Cyrus Farivar, Cops Must Now Get a Warrant to Use Stingrays in 
Washington State, ARS TECHNICA (May 12, 2015, 9:49 AM), 
http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2015/05/cops-must-now-get-a-warrant-to-
use-stingrays-in-washington-state/.  See also WASH. REV. CODE § 9.73.270 
(2015); VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-56.2 (2012).     
33. S.B. 178, 2015-2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2015). 
34. Stingray Tracking Devices, supra note 30. 
35. Memorandum: Warrant Requirement for the Use of Stingrays in New 
5
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New York’s standard marks a striking distinction.  This 
Comment will argue that New York should follow the federal 
agencies’ and states’ leads by imposing a warrant requirement 
supported by probable cause on local and state agencies that 
wish to use Stingray technology in their investigations.  The 
first section will explore Stingray technology and how it works.  
The second section will frame the issue and describe New 
York’s current standard.  The third section will discuss the 
judicial response to the issue and how New York courts seem to 
place the burden of upholding privacy on the citizen, instead of 
the government.  The third section will also discuss a possible 
shift in New York courts’ stance on privacy, examining a recent 
dispute in Erie County that involved unauthorized Stingray 
use.  The fourth section will discuss the legislative response to 
the issue, which consists of two state bills and a federal bill 
that could change New York’s policy.  The fifth and final 
section will argue why New York should adopt a warrant 
requirement supported by probable cause. 
 
II. What is a Stingray? 
As mentioned above, “Stingray” is just one name for a 
collection of cell-site simulators.36 Cell-site simulators, also 
called International Mobile Subscriber Identity (IMSI) 
catchers, “trick . . . phones nearby into connecting to the device 
in order to log the IMSI number of mobile phones in the area or 
capture the content of communications.”37  Other names for the 
tracking technology include Gossamer and triggerfish.38  The 
 
York, N.Y. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Aug. 2015), 
http://www.nyclu.org/files/memo_stingrayuse_NY_201508_final.pdf 
[hereinafter Memorandum: Warrant Requirement]. 
36. Stingray Tracking Devices, supra note 30; Harris Corporation, a 
Florida-based company, manufactures Stingrays and other “surveillance 
technologies” used by government agencies.  See Gallagher, supra note 1. 
37. Cell-Site Simulators: Frequently Asked Questions, ELECTRONIC 
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/sls/tech/cell-site-simulators/faq#faq-
How-do-law-enforcement-agencies-use-cell-site-simulators? (last visited Oct. 
20, 2016) [hereinafter ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.]. 
38. Kim Zetter, Turns Out Police Stingray Spy Tools Can Indeed Record 
Calls, WIRED (Oct. 28, 2015, 3:00 PM), 
http://www.wired.com/2015/10/stingray-government-spy-tools-can-record-
calls-new-documents-confirm/. 
6https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/10
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name “Stingray” dominates, however, because its 
manufacturer, Harris Corporation, reportedly has an exclusive 
contract with the United States.39  According to technology 
publication Ars Technica, Harris’ products “provide capabilities 
that authorities claim other companies do not offer.”40 
Federal, state, and local agencies may purchase cell-site 
simulators from Harris Corporation or various other outlets, 
including Rayzone and Atos.41  Once purchased, Stingray 
installation should not be an issue, as Stingrays “can be 
covertly set up virtually anywhere.”42  Stingrays use a stronger 
signal than mobile service towers to force cell phones in the 
area to register with the Stingray instead.43  A Stingray’s range 
spans approximately 1,000 feet, but varies with antenna size 
and other specifications.44  While it is not definitively clear, 
some sources specify that a cell phone must be powered on for a 
Stingray to track it.45 
Once a cell phone registers, the Stingray can obtain the 
phone’s unique ID and pinpoint its exact location—even inside 
an office or residence.46  The officer or agency using the device 
can then use a computer connected to the Stingray to access 
the data.47  Aside from location-tracking, Stingrays also have 
the capability to reveal the “content of communications.”48  The 
DOJ asserts, however, that its agents cannot use Stingrays to 
intercept communications, including “emails, texts, contact 
lists and images.”49 
Stingray use seems to have taken off in the new 
millennium.50  According to Ars Technica, “[t]rademark records 
 
39. Gallagher, supra note 1. 
40. Id. 
41. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 37. 
42. Gallagher, supra note 1. 
43. Zetter, supra note 38. 
44. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 37. 
45. Id. 
46. Zetter, supra note 38. 
47. Matthew Keys, Exclusive: Stingray Maker Asked FCC to Block 
Release of Spy Gear Manual, THEBLOT.COM (Mar. 26, 2015), 
http://www.theblot.com/exclusive-stingray-maker-asked-fcc-to-block-release-
of-spy-gear-manual-7739514. 
48. Gallagher, supra note 1. 
49. Justice Department Announces, supra note 7. 
50. See Gallagher, supra note 1. 
7
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show that a registration for the Stingray was first filed in 
August 2001.”51  Since then, government agencies have 
frequently purchased the device, which costs approximately 
$70,000 for the original or $135,000 for an updated version.52  
Ars Technica estimates that cell-site simulator manufacturers 
have made millions on the product since the early 2000s.53 
Much controversy surrounds the use of Stingray 
technology.54  News outlets and other sources frequently use 
one word to describe the controversy: secrecy.55  For example, 
citizens may believe that agencies only use the technology for 
national security purposes, but may not know that they also 
use it for local, criminal investigations.56  Citizens are not the 
only ones unaware of the scope of Stingray use; the courts have 
also been shielded from Stingray use in local investigations.57  
For example, beginning in 2010, officers in Erie County, New 
York used Stingrays forty-six times without a court order or a 
warrant.58 
The secrecy stems from non-disclosure agreements 
between cell-site simulator manufacturers, such as Harris 
Corporation, and local or state agencies.59  One example of a 
non-disclosure agreement between the City of Tucson, Arizona 
and Harris reads: 
 
The City of Tucson shall not discuss, publish, 
release or disclose any information pertaining to 
products covered under this [non-disclosure 
agreement] to any third party individual, 
corporation . . . or other governmental entity 
 
51. Id. 
52. Id. 
53. Id. 
54. See Kim Zetter, NY Cops Used ‘Stingray’ Spy Tool 46 Times Without 
Warrant, WIRED (Apr. 7, 2015, 5:08 PM), http://www.wired.com/2015/04/ny-
cops-used-stingray-spy-tool-46-times-without-warrant/. 
55. ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., supra note 37. 
56. Id. 
57. See Zetter, supra note 54. 
58. Id. 
59. Complaint & Application for Order to Show Cause at 3, Hodai v. City 
of Tucson, 2014 Ariz. Super. LEXIS 2158 (Ariz. Sup. Ct. Dec. 11, 2014) (No. 
C20141225). 
8https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/10
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without the prior written consent of Harris . . . in 
the event that the city receives a Public Records 
request from a third party relating to any 
Protected Product, or other information Harris 
deems confidential, the City will notify Harris of 
such a request and allow Harris to challenge any 
such request in court.60 
 
Lawyers and journalists around the country wish to 
uncover and expose the details of agencies’ Stingray use so that 
citizens are fully aware of the technology’s capabilities.  That 
endeavor becomes more difficult, however, in states like New 
York, where local and state agencies can use Stingrays without 
obtaining a warrant supported by probable cause.61 
 
III. New York’s Current Standard: No Warrant 
Requirement 
Although the DOJ has made significant steps toward 
privacy through its September 2015 policy announcement, the 
policy falls short because it does not affect the states.62  Some 
states, however, either have cell-site simulator policies or have 
recently clarified their stances.  For example, the Pennsylvania 
State Police (PSP) has a fact sheet that discloses its ownership 
of a cell-site simulator and explains how it is used.63  In 
Raleigh, North Carolina, police department spokesperson Jim 
Sughrue has stated that “departmental use of the [cell-site 
simulator] technology complies with state and federal 
 
60. Id. at 3-4. 
61. Legislative Memo, supra note 3. 
62. ACLU Comment on New Justice Department Guidelines for Secretive 
Stingray Surveillance Devices, AM. CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Sept. 3, 2015), 
https://www.aclu.org/news/aclu-comment-new-justice-department-guidelines-
secretive-stingray-surveillance-devices. 
63. FAQ’s on Cell Site Simulators, PA. STATE POLICE, 
http://www.psp.pa.gov/public-
safety/Documents/FAQ%20CellSiteSimulators%202015%20revision3.pdf (last 
visited Jan. 22, 2016).  The Pennsylvania State Police seeks a court order 
“approved and signed by a Judge in either the Court of Common Pleas or the 
PA Superior Court” before using the device, except in exigent circumstances. 
Id. 
9
 2016 UPHOLDING CITIZENS’ PRIVACY 361 
requirements.”64  Sughrue, however, did not go into further 
detail.65 
To date, New York does not have a Stingray policy that 
requires a warrant supported by probable cause.66  The New 
York Civil Liberties Union [hereinafter “NYCLU”], a non-profit 
civil rights group founded in 1951, does not think warrantless 
use of Stingrays in New York should continue, urging the state 
to take a stance.67  On October 30, 2015 the New York City 
Police Department’s [hereinafter “NYPD”] Legal Bureau 
responded to a Freedom of Information Law (FOIL) request 
from NYCLU, confirming its ownership and use of cell-site 
simulators without a warrant.68  This was the first time the 
NYPD publicly acknowledged its use of Stingrays, showing that 
it had used the technology more than 1,000 times between 2008 
and May 2015.69 
In its response, the NYPD stated that it does not have a 
written cell-site simulator policy, but it does have a two-page 
non-disclosure agreement with Harris Corporation.70  The 
NYPD also stated that it follows New York’s Criminal 
Procedure Law § 705 before using cell-site simulators.71  The 
Criminal Procedure Law does not specifically reference 
Stingrays or other cell-site simulators, but § 705.10 does 
discuss the use of pen registers and trap and trace devices,72 
which are instruments that record metadata.73  Metadata is a 
 
64. Raleigh, Durham Police Using Device that Tracks Cellphone Data, 
WRAL (July 28, 2014), http://www.wral.com/raleigh-durham-police-using-
device-that-tracks-cellphone-data/13847158/. 
65. Id. 
66. Memorandum: Warrant Requirement, supra note 35. 
67. Id. 
68. Letter from Richard Mantellino, Lieutenant, Records Access Officer, 
NYPD, to Mariko Hirose, N.Y. Civil Liberties Union (Oct. 30, 2015), 
http://www.nyclu.org/files/releases/NYPD%20original%20FOIL%20response%
20Stingrays.pdf. 
69. NYPD Has Used Stingrays More Than 1,000 Times Since 2008, N.Y. 
CIV. LIBERTIES UNION (Feb. 11, 2016), http://www.nyclu.org/news/nypd-has-
used-stingrays-more-1000-times-2008. 
70. Letter from Richard Mantellino, supra note 68. 
71. Id. 
72. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 705.10 (1988). 
73. OFF. OF THE INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T. OF JUST., A REVIEW OF THE 
FBI’S USE OF PEN REGISTER AND TRAP AND TRACE DEVICES UNDER THE FOREIGN 
INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT IN 2007 THROUGH 2009 1 (2015), 
10https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/10
 362 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  37:1 
collection of “telephone numbers, e-mail addresses, and other 
dialing, routing, addressing, or signaling information that it is 
transmitted by instruments or facilities . . . that carry wire or 
electronic communications.”74  Similar to the cell-site simulator 
policy, the DOJ states that pen register and trap and trace 
devices do not record the “contents of communications.”75  
Under § 705.10, an agency need only obtain a court order 
supported by “reasonable suspicion” to use a pen register or 
trap and trace device.76  In the Editors’ Notes, commentator 
Peter Preiser notes the lower burden of proof and that the 
“probable cause” standard is “constitutionally and statutorily 
required for search and electronic eavesdropping warrants.”77  
Finally, the NYPD listed situations where it did not apply for a 
court order before it used a cell-site simulator because of 
“compellingly exigent circumstances.”78  The examples, 
spanning from 2008 through May 21, 2015, include kidnaping, 
robbery, homicide, missing person, and stalking.79 
Less than three months before the NYPD’s response, the 
NYCLU published a memorandum that analyzed New York’s 
eavesdropping laws, concluding that New York should require 
warrants.80  The memorandum first mentions the irony of 
warrantless searches in New York in light of the fact that New 
York offers greater eavesdropping protection to citizens than 
the United States Constitution does.81  In particular, the 
NYCLU honed in on New York Penal Law § 250.05, the state’s 
eavesdropping law.82  The memorandum explained that it is 
unlawful to eavesdrop without a warrant issued under § 700 or 
a court order issued under § 705.83  The NYCLU reads the 
 
https://oig.justice.gov/reports/2015/o1506.pdf. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. § 705.10. 
77. Id. See also Memorandum: Warrant Requirement, supra note 35, 
which discusses the eavesdropping warrant requirement. 
78. Letter from Richard Mantellino, supra note 68. 
79. Id. 
80. Memorandum: Warrant Requirement, supra note 35. 
81. Id. at 2.  (“New York’s criminal prohibition on eavesdropping is 
broader than its federal counterpart.” Id.). 
82. Id. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.05 (McKinney 2016). 
83. Id. 
11
 2016 UPHOLDING CITIZENS’ PRIVACY 363 
eavesdropping law to regulate Stingrays “even when it is not 
being used to eavesdrop on phone conversations and messages” 
because of further definitions found in § 250.00.84  First, § 
250.00(6) defines “intercepting or accessing of an electronic 
communication” as “intentional acquiring, receiving, collecting, 
overhearing, or recording of an electronic communication, 
without the consent of the sender or intended receiver, by means 
of any instrument, device or equipment. . . .”85  Next, “electronic 
communication” is “any transfer of signs, signals, writing . . . or 
intelligence of any nature. . . .”86  But, as the memorandum 
points out, there are exceptions to § 250.00(5), two of which 
may pertain to Stingray use.87  The exception that is relevant 
to this paper is (5)(c), which reads: “any communication made 
through a tracking device consisting of an electronic or 
mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement 
of a person or object.”88  As the memorandum points out, this 
language could be seen as exempting Stingrays from the 
eavesdropping warrant requirement, as Stingrays are often 
used as tracking devices.89  However, the NYCLU still believes 
that this reason fails due to the New York Court of Appeals’ 
2009 decision in People v. Weaver,90 which is discussed in 
Section III of this Comment.  Finally, it is interesting to note 
that the memorandum does not think Stingrays fall under 
“primitive” pen register or trap and trace devices, despite the 
DOJ’s statement to the contrary.91  The NYCLU does not 
categorize Stingrays as such because they can do more than 
pen registers and trap and trace devices, such as “capture the 
unique manufacturer number and location information.”92  In 
 
84. Id. 
85. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 250.00(6) (2003) (emphasis added). 
86. Id. § 250.00(5). 
87. Memorandum: Warrant Requirement, supra note 35, at 2-3.  See §§ 
250.00(5)(a), (c). 
88. § 250.00(5)(c) (emphasis added). 
89. Memorandum: Warrant Requirement, supra note 35, at 3. 
90. Id. (“Even if Stingrays were exempt as a tracking device, however, 
People v. Weaver, 12 N.Y.3d 433 (2009), as explained in Part II, requires law 
enforcement to obtain warrants for just such tracking uses.”). 
91. Id.  See Department of Justice Policy Guidance, supra note 8, at 2 
(“Moreover, cell-site simulators used by the Department must be configured 
as pen registers . . . ”). 
92. Memorandum: Warrant Requirement, supra note 35, at 3. 
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sum, the NYCLU advocates for a warrant requirement for 
Stingray use and has pointed to various applicable statutory 
provisions.93 
Although the NYCLU cited federal and state constitutions 
as authority, it did not cite specific provisions besides a general 
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures.94  An 
important provision to consider is Article I, Section 12 of the 
New York State Constitution.95  The second paragraph reads: 
 
The right of the people to be secure against 
unreasonable interception of telephone and 
telegraph communications shall not be violated, 
and ex parte orders or warrants shall issue only 
upon oath or affirmation that there is a 
reasonable ground to believe that evidence of 
crime may be thus obtained, and identifying the 
particular means of communication, and 
particularly describing the person or persons 
whose communications are to be intercepted and 
the purposes thereof.96 
 
A few things are worth noting.  The first is the provision’s 
reference to a telephone, considering the fact that this 
provision was adopted in 1938,97 a time when telephones were 
not nearly as relevant as they are today.  The second is the 
requisite burden of proof: reasonable belief.98  While New 
York’s Fourth Amendment counterpart adds greater protection 
to citizens, since the Fourth Amendment does not contain the 
paragraph quoted above,99 it fails to make the necessary step in 
its protection.  This provision would likely put an end to New 
York’s unwarranted Stingray use if it required a warrant 
supported by probable cause, as opposed to an order or warrant 
 
93. Id. 
94. Id. 
95. N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
96. Id. (emphasis added). 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
99. Id. The Fourth Amendment, ratified in 1791, only protects “persons, 
houses, papers, and effects.”  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
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issued upon reasonable belief.  Thus, although the 1938 
provision is forward-looking in its paragraph about technology, 
it fails to provide an appropriate basis for holding New York 
state agencies accountable for unwarranted Stingray use.  Let 
us consider how issues of privacy and location tracking have 
been decided in New York courts. 
 
IV. Judicial Response: Burden of Privacy on the 
Citizen 
Justice Harlan’s concurrence in Katz v. United States 
(1961) established a framework for privacy, fully-equipped with 
a two-part subjective/objective analysis: “[F]irst that a person 
have exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy 
and, second, that the expectation be one that society is 
prepared to recognize as ‘reasonable.’”100  This inquiry seems 
like the proper starting place in looking at judicial opinions 
regarding privacy, since the “Katz test” has been widely cited 
and is still followed today. 
New York’s unwarranted use of Stingrays may come as a 
bit of a surprise, considering its strict position on location 
tracking in People v. Weaver.101  In that case, a police officer 
attached a GPS device to the defendant’s car (unbeknownst to 
him).102  The officer did not obtain a warrant before planting 
the device, which remained on the defendant’s car for sixty-five 
days.103  The record did not reveal why the officers wished to 
track the defendant, but the officers eventually charged and 
tried him with burglary.104  The jury convicted him on both 
burglary counts.105  The Appellate Division affirmed the 
defendant’s conviction, holding that officers did not violate his 
Fourth Amendment right by tracking him without a 
warrant.106  The Appellate Division also held that the 
defendant “had no greater right to relief under the State 
Constitution” and that he had a “reduced expectation or 
 
100. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967). 
101. See generally People v. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d 1195 (N.Y. 2009). 
102. Id. at 1195. 
103. Id. at 1195-96. 
104. Id. at 1196. 
105. Id. 
106. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1196. 
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privacy in the exterior of his vehicle.”107 
The New York Court of Appeals disagreed.  It began its 
analysis by distinguishing the United States Supreme Court’s 
holding in United States v. Knotts.108  In Knotts, officers placed 
a beeper on a five-gallon drum of chloroform to track the 
drum’s location.109  A car transported the drum across public 
roads before reaching its destination at the respondent’s 
cabin.110  The Court held that the defendant “undoubtedly had 
the traditional expectation of privacy within a dwelling place 
insofar as the cabin was concerned,” but he had a lesser 
expectation of privacy concerning the “visual observation” of 
the car traveling on public roads and arriving at his cabin.111  
The Court also explained that the government made “limited 
use” of the beeper, ending its surveillance once the drum 
“ended its automotive journey” at the defendant’s home.112  The 
beeper aided law enforcement, who would not have been able 
investigate the whereabouts with a naked eye, and the Court 
stated that “scientific enhancement of this sort raises no 
constitutional issues which visual surveillance would not also 
raise.”113 
The Weaver court did not extend Knotts’ rationale to the 
present case.  The court held that the only similarity between 
the cases is that Mr. Weaver’s car traveled on public roads, 
which anyone could have observed.114  The court found 
significant the fact that the officers in Knotts used the “mere 
beeper” to track the chloroform drum for only one trip.115  In 
contrast, the officers in this case tracked the defendant’s car for 
sixty-five days.116 
 
107. Id. 
108. See United States v. Knotts, 460 U.S. 276 (1983).  See also United 
States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772 (6th Cir. 2012) (holding that an individual 
did not retain a reasonable expectation of privacy in the location of his 
cellphone while traveling on a public road). 
109. Knotts, 460 U.S. at 277. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 282. 
112. Id. at 285. 
113. Id. 
114. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1198-99 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281). 
115. Id. at 1199. 
116. Id. at 1195. 
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Since the United States Supreme Court had not yet 
decided “whether the use of GPS by the state for the purpose of 
criminal investigation constitute[d] a search under the Fourth 
Amendment,”117 the court turned to New York’s Constitution as 
a guide.118  Since the court found that the officers infringed 
upon the defendant’s expectation of privacy when they placed 
the GPS device on his vehicle and tracked his location, it thus 
held that the officers’ activity constituted a “search” under the 
state’s Constitution.119 
Finally, the court expressed concern over the potential 
abuse of advanced tracking tools, noting that “the technology is 
rapidly improving so that any person or object, such as a car, 
may be tracked with uncanny accuracy to virtually any interior 
or exterior location, at any time and regardless of atmospheric 
conditions.”120  The court ultimately held that the officers 
should have obtained a warrant,121 which preserves the 
valuable character of tracking technology while staying within 
“judicial oversight.”122  The court also noted that no exigent 
circumstance waived the warrant requirement.123 
Three years later, the United States Supreme Court issued 
an opinion consistent with the majority’s view in Weaver.  In 
United States v. Jones, the Court held that placing a GPS 
device on a vehicle and tracking its movement constituted a 
“search” under the Fourth Amendment.124  In that case, officers 
became suspicious that the defendant engaged in narcotics 
trafficking, so they applied to the United States District Court 
for the District of Columbia for a search warrant to install a 
GPS device on the defendant’s car.125  The court issued the 
warrant, but it authorized the officers to install the device only 
 
117. Id. at 1202.  The United States Supreme Court would later address 
this issue in United States v. Jones. See infra note 124. 
118. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1202. 
119. Id.  The court cited Article 1, Section 12 as the relevant 
Constitutional provision. Id.; see N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 12. 
120. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199. 
121. Id. at 1203. 
122. Id. 
123. Id. at 1201. 
124. United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).  See also U.S. 
CONST. amend. IV. 
125. Id. at 948. 
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in that jurisdiction and “within [ten] days.”126 
The officers did not install the technology in the ten-day 
window and instead decided to install it while the car was 
parked in a “public parking lot” in Maryland.127  The officers 
then used the GPS device to follow the car’s movements for 
twenty-eight days.128  The officers also had to replace the 
battery during that twenty-eight-day period, and they replaced 
it while the car was parked in a different parking lot in that 
state.129  The tracking culminated in various drug charges filed 
against the defendant.130 
Before trial, the defendant moved to suppress the evidence 
gathered through use of the tracking device.131  The district 
court only granted the defendant’s motion in regard to tracking 
the car while it was parked in a lot next to his home.132  
Regarding the rest of the data, the court cited Knotts’ rationale 
that the defendant had “no reasonable expectation of privacy” 
while traveling on public roadways.133  At trial, the jury 
convicted the defendant, and he received a life sentence.134  On 
appeal, the D.C. Circuit reversed the defendant’s conviction on 
the ground that the officers’ use of the tracking device in 
Maryland, without a warrant, violated the defendant’s Fourth 
Amendment right.135 
The Supreme Court supported the D.C. Circuit’s holding 
and offered independent reasons.  The Court explained that the 
Fourth Amendment protects citizens from government trespass 
upon their “persons, houses, papers, and effects.”136  The Court 
also pointed to the government’s own statement that the 
officers went beyond a plain observation of the defendant’s 
vehicle when they attached the GPS device to the underbody of 
 
126. Id. 
127. Id. 
128. Id. 
129. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 948. 
130. Id. 
131. Id. 
132. Id. 
133. Id. (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 281). 
134. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 949. 
135. Id. 
136. Id. at 951 (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IV). 
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the car.137  The Court thus concluded that “[b]y attaching the 
device to the Jeep, officers encroached on a protected area.”138 
The Court affirmed the Court of Appeals’ decision.139 
In the meantime, lower New York courts have weighed in 
on expectations of privacy.  As tracking technology has 
developed, so have the courts’ views on who bears the burden 
in protecting privacy.  Surprisingly, the New York courts do not 
follow the path taken by the Weaver and Jones courts.  The 
first case in an important trilogy is People v. Hall.  In that case, 
the defendant was indicted on murder and assault charges.140  
At trial, the defendant moved to “suppress historical cell site 
location information (CSLI) for calls made over his cell phone 
during the three-day period surrounding the shootings,” but 
the court denied his motion.141  The jury ultimately convicted 
the defendant of third-degree assault and second-degree 
criminal weapon possession.142 
On appeal, the First Department affirmed the defendant’s 
conviction.143  The court also affirmed the lower court’s denial 
of suppression on the ground that gathering the defendant’s 
location information “did not violate the Fourth Amendment . . 
. because defendant had no reasonable expectation of privacy 
while traveling in public.”144  The court similarly found no 
constitutional argument under New York’s Constitution.145  
The court also made a statutory argument, holding that 18 
U.S.C § 2703(d) (2012) did not require the government to 
establish probable cause.146  This statute, however, has since 
been held unconstitutional.147 
 
137. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 950-52 (questioning Knotts, 460 U.S. at 282). 
138. Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 952. 
139. Id. at 954. 
140. People v. Hall, 926 N.Y.S.2d 514, 516 (App. Div. 2011). 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 517. 
144. Id. at 516.  In fact, the First Department cited Knotts as authority 
for this contention. Id. 
145. Hall, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 516. 
146. Id. 
147. Id.  The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals deemed 18 U.S.C. § 2703 
unconstitutional on the ground that the statute only required officers to have 
“reasonable ground” of suspicion (instead of probable cause) to obtain a 
warrant.  United States v. Davis, 754 F.3d 1205, 1212-16 (11th Cir. 2014), 
18https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/10
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Finally, the First Department distinguished this case from 
Weaver.148  The court considered the number of days involved in 
each tracking scheme; the detectives in Weaver tracked the 
defendant for sixty-five days, contrasted with “a mere 3 days” 
in this case.149  It is interesting to note how the Weaver court 
contrasted its case with Knotts by also using the number of 
days, showing that the officers in Weaver tracked the defendant 
for a much longer span of time.150  Thus, the Weaver court held 
that the unwarranted tracking violated the Fourth 
Amendment.151  But in Hall, the court used Weaver’s strategy 
to reach a different outcome: since the officers in Hall only 
tracked the defendant’s location for a few days, their activity 
did not rise to the level of a “protracted surveillance” in 
Weaver.152  Although Hall addresses CSLI technology instead of 
Stingrays, it shows that New York courts might be returning to 
the Knotts framework of lessening a citizen’s expectation of 
privacy in public places. 
The second case in the trilogy is People v. Moorer, which 
introduces the idea that the burden of privacy might be on the 
citizen, as opposed to the government agency that wishes to 
gather the information and use it during investigations.153  In 
that case, officers identified the defendant as a suspect in a 
homicide investigation.154  They filed a request with Sprint, the 
defendant’s service provider, to “ping” his phone and reveal its 
location.155  Sprint, however, was unable to “ping” the 
defendant’s phone because “it had been ‘powered off.’”156  The 
officers filed a second request, and this time, Sprint was able to 
 
vacated, reh’g granted 573 F. App’x 925 (Mem) (2014).  Although Davis has 
been vacated, pending rehearing en banc, there is nothing to indicate that § 
2703 is valid law.  To the contrary, the statute has pending legislation. 
148. Hall, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 516. 
149. Id. at 516-17 (citing Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1195). 
150. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1199 (citing Knotts, 460 U.S. at 279). 
151. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1202. 
152. Hall, 926 N.Y.S.2d at 516-17. 
153. See generally People v. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d 868 (Monroe Cty. Ct. 
2013). 
154. Id. at 872. 
155. Id. The officers claimed exigent circumstances because they were 
investigating a homicide and they believed the suspect was going to commit 
another homicide.  Id. 
156. Id. 
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pinpoint the phone’s location to an eleven-meter radius.157  The 
officers gained permission to enter and search the home where 
they suspected the phone to be and they found the phone in a 
backpack on the porch.158  They ultimately charged the 
defendant with second-degree murder.159 
Before trial, the defendant “moved to suppress all evidence 
obtained as a result of the ‘pinging’ of his cell phone . . . .”160  
During a suppression hearing, the defendant argued that the 
officers violated “both federal and state constitutional rights” 
when they conducted the searches without a warrant or court 
order.161  Although the court denied the government’s exigent 
circumstances argument, it ultimately held that the 
defendant’s constitutional rights were not violated.162 
The court focused its analysis on voluntary versus 
involuntary actions.163  The court noted that location services in 
cell-phones are pre-installed “with the owner’s consent or 
knowledge,” as opposed to “physical[ly] install[ing]” a tracking 
device on a citizen’s car without the person’s permission.164  
The court made a sweeping policy argument about the 
increased use of cell-phones and privacy implications, stating: 
 
public ignorance about cell phone technology can 
no longer be maintained in this day and age—cell 
phones are voluntarily carried by their users and 
may be turned on or off at will.  People are not so 
oblivious that they are not aware that cell 
phones purchased today come with GPS 
technology which can pinpoint the location of the 
phone at any given time so long as it is turned on 
and the GPS technology has not been deactivated 
or disabled . . . By a person’s voluntary 
utilization, through GPS technology, of a cell 
 
157. Id. 
158. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d at 872-73. 
159. Id. at 871. 
160. Id. 
161. Id. at 874-75. 
162. Id. at 875-81. 
163. Moorer, 959 N.Y.S.2d at 881. 
164. Id. at 878, 881. 
20https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol37/iss1/10
 372 PACE LAW REVIEW Vol.  37:1 
phone, a person necessarily has no reasonable 
expectation of privacy with respect to the phone’s 
location—vis a vis the pinging—even though he 
maintains what may be a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in the content of his phone 
conversations.165 
 
The court upheld the lower court’s decision, holding that 
“pinging” the defendant’s cell phone did not violate his 
rights.166 
The court’s language about the public’s knowledge and use 
of cell phones represents a stark contrast from the DOJ’s Sept. 
3 policy.  The DOJ policy does not say that citizens lessen their 
expectations of privacy by voluntarily carrying or using their 
cell phones.  Rather, the DOJ explicitly shows that the 
government bears the burden of privacy because it now 
requires federal agencies to obtain warrants before cell-site 
simulators.167  Thus, the federal agencies must prove why they 
want the location information.  The Hall court, however, seems 
to say that citizens bear the burden of privacy and should 
already know that the government can track them if their 
phones are powered on.  The court makes this point clear by 
saying citizens enjoy “no” expectation of privacy in this context, 
instead of “lessened.”  It can hardly be denied that many more 
citizens own technology than in past years, but the DOJ makes 
clear that it still intends to achieve a balance between security 
and privacy. 
Following Hall’s lead, the third case in the trilogy 
continued the discussion of cell phone users and their 
expectations of privacy.  In People v. Wells, the officers 
demonstrated exigent circumstances to “ping” the defendant’s 
cell phone while investigating a shooting.168  The court denied 
the defendant’s suppression motion, and also commented on 
the developing debate about expectations of privacy: 
 
Finally, in this year, 2014, it can be said that cell 
 
165. Id. (emphasis added). 
166. Id. 
167. Justice Department Announces, supra note 7. 
168. People v. Wells, 991 N.Y.S.2d 743, 744 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2014). 
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phone users, (including non-adult users) are 
aware of both the capacity for their phone to be 
located by GPS, and their ability to avoid that 
function by turning off their phone . . . it can no 
longer be said that one can reasonably expect 
that a cell phone that is turned on will have its 
location remain private . . . [it] is part of the 
package for cell phone users.169 
 
Wells seems to be consistent with Hall, showing that the 
burden of privacy is on the citizen.  The cases seem to imply 
that if someone does not want to be tracked, it is up to them to 
turn off their phones, not up to the government to prove why 
they need the information. 
The purpose of this Comment is not to overstate the lower 
New York courts’ holdings or extend their meaning beyond 
what was intended.  The New York courts addressed the issue 
of “pinging” by cell-phone companies, not cell-site simulation 
conducted by the government. However, the underlying 
principles of security and privacy that can be pulled from these 
cases demonstrate the differing views of New York and the 
federal government.  It is interesting that New York seemed to 
be ahead of the federal government in upholding citizens’ 
privacy during location tracking.  Weaver, decided in 2009, held 
that location tracking via GPS constituted a “search” under the 
Fourth Amendment.170  The federal government, however, did 
not release its policy regarding Fourth Amendment concerns in 
location tracking via cell phones until 2015.171 
The New York courts’ exposure to location tracking, cell 
phones, and expectations of privacy did not end after the 
trilogy.  In fact, it became more specific, involving Stingray 
technology and continued, unwarranted use of the technology.  
As noted earlier, the ACLU’s map shows that New York state 
and local agencies use cell-site simulators.172  The Erie County 
Sherriff’s Office, however, wanted to keep its use of Stingray 
 
169. Id. at 746 (emphasis added). 
170. Weaver, 909 N.E.2d at 1202. 
171. Justice Department Announces, supra note 7. 
172. Stingray Tracking Devices, supra note 30. 
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technology under wraps.173 
In July 2014, the NYCLU filed a public information 
request with the Erie County Sheriff’s Office to obtain 
information about the office’s use of “Stingray” technology.174 
After the office denied the request, the NYCLU brought an 
action in the New York Supreme Court, Erie County, in 
November 2014.175  The NYCLU prevailed; the court ordered 
the office to release “purchase orders, a letter from the 
stingrays’ manufacturer, a confidentiality agreement with [sic] 
between the Sheriff’s Office and the FBI, a procedural manual 
and summary reports of instances in which the device was 
used.”176 
The NYCLU then released its findings, which showed that 
the office used the technology “at least 47 times between May 
1, 2010 and October 3, 2014, including assisting other law 
enforcement departments like the Monroe County Sheriff’s 
Office.”177  In addition, the office obtained a court order only 
one time.178  Finally, the NYCLU’s records revealed that the 
confidentiality agreement with the FBI required the office to 
“maintain almost secrecy over stingray records” and “dismiss 
criminal prosecutions [at times] rather than risk compromising 
the secrecy of how stingrays are used.”179 
The New York Supreme Court’s order requiring the office 
to release records shows a possible shift in New York’s stance 
on privacy.  The decision shows a lack of tolerance for 
unwarranted Stingray use in New York.  New York courts may 
rethink earlier ideas of privacy that stemmed from cases like 
Moorer and Hall.  Since this appears to be the first time a New 
York court dealt with Stingray technology, maybe the courts 
will decide future cases in accordance with the Erie County 
 
173. See Erie County Sheriff Records Reveal Invasive Use of “Stingray” 
Technology, N.Y. CIVIL LIBERTIES UNION (Apr. 7, 2015), 
http://www.nyclu.org/news/erie-county-sheriff-records-reveal-invasive-use-of-
stingray-technology [hereinafter Erie County Sheriff Records]. 
174. In re N.Y. Civil Liberties Union v. Erie Cty. Sheriff’s Office, No. 
2014/000206, 2015 WL 1295966, at *1 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2015). 
175. Id. 
176. Erie County Sheriff Records, supra note 173. 
177. Id. 
178. Id. 
179. Id. 
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case. 
Recently, in a case of first impression in Maryland, the 
Court of Special Appeals considered whether “a cell phone—a 
piece of technology so ubiquitous as to be on the person of 
practically every citizen—may be transformed into a real-time 
tracking device by the government without a warrant.”180  The 
court held that it cannot, stating that the “people have a 
reasonable expectation that their cell phones will not be used 
as real-time tracking devices by law enforcement, and . . . that 
people have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in 
real-time cell phone location information.”181  Since the state’s 
use of cell-site simulator technology invoked the Fourth 
Amendment, the court required more than a simple court 
order; it required a warrant or “a specialized order that 
[includes] a particularized showing of probable cause . . . . “182 
It is true that the United States Supreme Court has yet to 
decide whether Stingray technology implicates Fourth 
Amendment concerns.183  However, the issue recently reached a 
federal district court in Manhattan, where the court 
invalidated the search of a Washington Heights apartment 
after officers seized drugs they discovered through 
unwarranted cell-site simulator use.184  This was a landmark 
ruling, as a federal judge had never suppressed such evidence 
before.185  With the issue gaining attention in the lower federal 
courts, Supreme Court review may not be as far away as 
before.  At the very least, we do know how the Supreme Court 
will handle searches of a cell phone’s contents in the future.186  
 
180. State v. Andrews, 134 A.3d 324, 326 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2016). 
181. Id. 
182. Id. at 358. 
183. Timothy Williams, Covert Electronic Surveillance Prompts Calls for 
Transparency, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 28, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/29/us/stingray-covert-electronic-
surveillance-prompts-calls-for-transparency.html?_r=0. 
184. Benjamin Weiser, D.E.A. Needed Warrant to Track Suspect’s Phone, 
Judge Says, N.Y. TIMES (July 12, 2016), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/13/nyregion/dea-needed-warrant-to-track-
suspects-phone-judge-says.html. 
185. Id. 
186. See Riley v. California, 134 S. Ct. 2473, 2493 (2014) (“Our holding, 
of course, is not that the information on a cell phone is immune from search; 
it is instead that a warrant is generally required before such a search, even 
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Through the recent cell-site simulator case in Maryland, we 
also see the state courts analyzing traditional Fourth 
Amendment concepts of searches, probable cause, and 
warrants, applying them to modern day location-tracking.  But 
New York should not wait to hear from the Court, or even its 
own courts; it should invoke its legislative authority and 
require warrants based on probable cause. 
 
IV. Legislative Response: Three Pending Bills 
 
State and federal legislators are responding to the public’s 
privacy concerns in unwarranted use of Stingrays.  Two bills 
have been proposed in New York that would change the way its 
state and local agencies use cell-site simulators.  A federal bill 
has also been proposed that would require all state and local 
agencies to obtain warrants based on probable cause before 
using the technology. 
The first bill is New York Senate Bill S4914A, sponsored 
by New York Senator Michael Ranzenhofer.187  The bill was 
proposed on April 23, 2015 and is currently in the committee.188  
The bill seeks to amend New York’s Criminal Procedure Law 
section 705 by adding a seventh definition.189  A definition of 
“mobile phone surveillance device or system” would include 
“technology that identifies, tracks, or locates cellular devices by 
forcing each compatible cellular device in a given area to 
disconnect from its service provider cell site and establish a 
new connection with the device by mimicking a wireless cell 
tower.”190  This bill does not rise to the level of the DOJ’s 
warrant requirement, but instead proposes a court order 
requirement.191  The officer would only need to demonstrate 
“reasonable suspicion that a designated crime has been, is 
being, or is about to be committed . . .” to obtain permission to 
 
when a cell phone is seized incident to arrest.”).  The Riley Court cites Jones 
and references a cell phone’s ability to “reconstruct someone’s specific 
movements down to the minute,” id. at 2490, but the Court does not address 
location-tracking in depth. 
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track a person’s location.192  Considering the DOJ’s and other 
states’ warrant requirements, this proposed bill would still 
keep New York courts behind, as it appears from the NYPD’s 
statement that it does seek court orders before using the 
technology.193 
The second proposed bill, however, rises to the appropriate 
level.  New York Senate Bill 8055, introduced on June 5, 2015, 
seeks to require officers to obtain a warrant based on probable 
cause before using a cell site simulator to reveal a person’s 
location.194  The bill seeks to amend the definitions under New 
York’s eavesdropping law by adding the words “includes the 
use of a cell site simulator device” after the definition of 
“eavesdropping.”195  The bill also intends to add a definition for 
“cell site simulator device,” which would mean “a device that 
transmits or receives radio waves for the purpose of conducting 
one or more of the following operations: (A) identifying, 
locations, or tracking the movements of a communications 
device. . . .”196  Finally, the bill wants to make sure that cell-site 
simulators fit under the state’s eavesdropping laws so that they 
require a warrant supported by probable cause; the bill seeks 
to amend section 700.20(ii) (eavesdropping warrant 
application) by adding “to the extent known for a warrant 
authorizing use of a cell site simulator device.”197 
In November 2015, United States Representative Jason 
Chaffetz introduced the “Stingray Privacy Act of 2015,” which 
would require any “governmental entity” to obtain a warrant 
before using a cell-site simulator.198  His proposed bill is not 
limited to federal agencies.199  The bill does not set out a 
probable cause requirement, but it specifies the way in which 
cell-site simulators should be used.200  For example, the bill 
requires that no evidence obtained through a cell-site simulator 
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can be used during a proceeding, except if the agency obtains a 
warrant, conducts electronic surveillance, or uses it during an 
emergency.201  It is interesting to note that it specifically 
addresses national security,202 which seems to be at the 
forefront of issues facing the federal government. 
 
V. Conclusion: New York Should Require a Warrant 
The body of research surrounding cell-site simulators 
indicates that the devices are another piece of technology that 
our laws have not quite caught up to yet, similar to cell phone 
capabilities and social networking sites.  But this does not 
mean that we should accept the status quo.  For one, the DOJ 
shows that it is paying attention to citizens’ desire for privacy, 
while at the same time trying to keep these same citizens safe.  
Thus, I believe that New York should follow suit and adopt a 
warrant requirement supported by probable cause. 
Although the results in the lower New York courts 
demonstrate otherwise, I argue that the burden should be on 
the government to show why it needs to invade citizens’ 
privacy.  The Erie County revelation seemed to shock New 
York citizens, which shows that it is the appropriate moment 
for the state to establish an official Stingray policy with a 
probable cause requirement.  Other states have adopted new 
policies or clarified their policies even before the DOJ did.  As 
the DOJ notes, there are ways to balance privacy and national 
security.  It is completely understandable that there are 
exceptions to warrant requirements, especially in the wake of 
violence within this country and overseas.  But, absent 
exigency or emergency, both the federal and state governments 
should obtain warrants supported by probable cause before 
they employ these high-tech devices.  New York should be no 
different. 
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